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INTRODUCTION 
 
On January 1, 2008, the Labor Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (LCL) 
went into effect.  It was the country’s most significant piece of labor legislation in over a 
decade.  Whereas China’s 1994 Labor Law attempted to consolidate the early reform 
era’s scattered workplace regulations and adapt them for a market economy, the LCL 
aimed to rein in the worst aspects of the nation’s new labor relations regime and achieve 
a modicum of workforce stability.   
 
In the chaotic world of post-“reform and opening” China it had become routine for 
construction sites to wait until the end of the year to pay workers—and many workers 
were even then sent home without any pay whatsoever.  Shady “labor dispatch” 
companies (laodong paiqian gongsi) helped bosses skirt responsibility for their 
employees by obscuring labor relationships in a tangle of paperwork and spoken 
promises. Sweatshop exposés shamed powerful multinationals.  Slavery in backwoods 
brick kilns shocked the nation.  Strikes, road-blockings and other forms of worker protest 
constituted the largest single category of China’s rising “mass incident” rate,1 while the 
official All China Federation of Trade Unions scrambled to redefine its role.  
Unsurprisingly, workers tended to float from job to job, rarely investing much in any 
single position or skill. 
 
The LCL initiated many significant changes.2  First, it mandated written contracts for all 
workers: any employer that did not sign a contract with an employee was required to pay 
that employee double his or her wages for each month worked without a contract, starting 
with the second such month.3  Second, the law required a non-fixed-term contract for any 
employee who had worked for an employer more than ten years or who had already 
signed two successive fixed-term contracts.4  Third, it further clarified the responsibilities 
of employers to workers acquired through labor dispatch agencies (such as equal pay 
with permanent employees for equal work), and the role of unions and collective 
bargaining.5 Fourth, the LCL reaffirmed existing work injury, social insurance, and wage 
and hour provisions.6   
 
The legislation spurred an unprecedented debate.   International and domestic business 
groups predicted that the law would have a largely negative impact on business in China, 
while labor groups decried undue corporate influence over the latter stages of the law’s 
                                                
1 Andrew Wedeman, “Enemies of the State: Mass Incidents and Subversion in China,” paper Presented at 
the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada, September 2009. 
2 A useful exploration of the LCL’s changes can be found in E. Patrick McDermott, “Industrial Relations in 
China - Ball of Confusion,” in K. Townsend and A. Wilkinson (eds) Research Handbook on Work and 
Employment Relations, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, (forthcoming). 
3 National People’s Congress, Labor Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China, Articles 10, 82, 
January 1, 2007. 
4 Labor Contract Law, Article 14. 
5
 Labor Contract Law, Articles 4, 43, 51, 53-54, 58, 67, 92. 
6 Labor Contract Law, Articles 17, 38, 74. 
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drafting process.7 As 2007 drew to a close, employers used a variety of methods to avoid 
their imminent legal responsibilities, such as firing and then rehiring the same workers in 
order to get around the provision granting ten-year employees the right to non-fixed-term 
contracts.8 Chinese non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and ACFTU, in turn, raised 
awareness of the law through trainings, booklets and mass “legal publicity” (pu fa) 
events.  The international debate over the law forged new bonds between Chinese and 
foreign workers’ rights advocates. Shanghai Normal University’s Professor Liu Cheng, 
for example, traveled to the United States to rally support for the LCL.9 These bonds 
have continued to deepen and hold great promise. 
    
However, since the law went into effect, the international and domestic Chinese media 
have become fixated on the question of whether increased labor market regulation has 
sharpened the difficulties of China’s export sector during the economic downturn— an 
exceedingly difficult question to answer given the range of other factors at work: falling 
global demand, new government incentives for Chinese manufacturers, frozen (and then 
unfrozen) minimum wage increases, currency movements and changing local regulations. 
Labor activists, meanwhile, have begun to shift their focus to other worthy causes, such 
as collective bargaining and pension reform.   
 
The actual implementation of the LCL deserves more attention.   The number of labor 
disputes accepted by Chinese arbitration panels and courts nearly doubled in 2008 over 
the year before.10  While many factors contributed to this upsurge in litigation, the LCL 
was surely one.   What other effects has the law had? 
 
Absent an accompanying strategy of worker community-building and solidarity, the 
litigation of individual workers’ cases can only move any country partway toward full 
protection of workers’ rights.11 Yet even as we prepare for the next struggle, we must 
learn all we can about how legislation like the LCL has impacted workers thus far.    This 
report is meant as an initial exploration of these lessons. 
 
 
 
                                                
7 “Undue Influence: Corporations Gain Ground in Battle over China’s New Labor Law —But Human 
Rights and Labor Advocates Are Pushing Back,” Global Labor Strategies,  
http://laborstrategies.blogs.com/global_labor_strategies/files/undue_influence_global_labor_strategies.pdf, 
March 2007.  
8 The most prominent such case was that of the electronic giant Huawei.  See Chen Hong, “Thousands of 
Huawei Staff ‘Quit,’” China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2007-
11/03/content_6228248.htm, November 3, 2007. 
9 “The Global Battle Over New Rights for Chinese Workers,” Global Labor Strategies, 
http://laborstrategies.blogs.com/global_labor_strategies/2007/04/in_a_historical.html, April 3, 2007. 
10 Labor disputes double in 2008 amid slowdown, Xinhua, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-
05/09/content_7760281.htm, May 9, 2009. 
11 It has even been argued that by focusing exclusively on legal advocacy, workers’ groups are preventing 
working class solidarity.  See Ching Kwan Lee and Shen Yuan, “The Anti-Solidarity Machine: Labor 
NGOs in China,” Paper presented at the Conference on “The Changing Face of Chinese Labor and 
Employment”, Cornell ILR School, September 26-28, 2008. 
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Interviews with Workers   
  
The report is based on interviews with 367 workers in the Pearl River Delta and one city 
in the Yangtze River Delta.  In 2002, these two regions accounted for 34.6 percent and 
28.3 percent of the country's total export value, respectively.12  The interviews were 
conducted between January and May 2009.  During this period, China was still 
experiencing the worst effects of the global financial crisis.  Factories in both regions had 
shut down by the thousands, leading to protests over unpaid wages and a mass exodus of 
workers from precisely those areas where the interviews were conducted.  After reaching 
their lowest point in February 2009, China's export industries recovered somewhat, even 
leading to labor shortages in some places.13 
 
All of the workers interviewed during the course of this research were “migrant workers,” 
meaning rural Chinese citizens, often from the interior, who “migrate” to urban areas in 
search of employment opportunities.  Migrants make up a majority of the workforce in 
the manufacturing sectors of cities like Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Suzhou, and the 
construction sectors of cities like Beijing and Shanghai, but have only limited access to 
local public services, such as education for their children or job training programs 
because of the household registration or the “hukou system.” In late 2009, the National 
Development and Reform Commission announced that migrants with stable jobs would 
be given “permanent urban residence certificates,”14 thus potentially removing a primary 
source of discrimination against China’s rural population. However, it is unclear at the 
time of this writing how this new policy will be implemented, and a number of similar 
attempts at reform of the “hukou system” have had little practical impact.15  
 
Interviews with Businesses   
    
Since the earliest reforms designed to create a legal protection regime for workers were 
implemented in the mid-1990s, the Chinese government has acknowledged conflict of 
interest between employers and employees.16 Yet there has been a tendency of late on the 
part of both opponents and proponents of the LCL to conflate the interests of capital and 
labor. For example, East China University of Politics and Law Professor Dong Baohua, 
one the LCL’s earliest and fiercest opponents, wrote in January 2008 that “enterprises, 
workers, and the government” are all “on the same side” and that the law is harmful both 
                                                
12 Sam Ng, “China: Tale of Two Deltas,” Asia Times Online, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/EI06Ad01.html, September 6, 2003. 
13 Terence Poon and Andrew Batson, “China's Exports Continue Recovery,” The Wall Street Journal, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125790615310142901.html, November 12, 2009; “Labor Shortages 
Become Problems after Spring Festival,” CCTV.com, 
http://english.cctv.com/program/bizchina/20100221/104091.shtml, February 21, 2010. 
14 Zhao Chunzhe, "Rural Migrant Workers to Get Permanent City Residency," China 
Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-12/10/content_9154815.htm, December 10, 2009. 
15 Kam Wing Chan and Will Buckingham, "Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?" The China 
Quarterly, 195, September 2008. 
16 Sheila Oakley, Labor Relations in China’s Socialist Market Economy, (Westport CT: Quorum Books, 
2002), pg. 102-103; Mary Gallagher and Junlu Jiang, “Guest Editor’s Introduction,” Chinese Law and 
Government, Vol. 35 no 6 (November-December 2002), pg. 3-15. 
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to that unity and to the interests of each group individually, with businesses losing 
flexibility, workers losing jobs, and the government consequently facing social 
instability.17 Supporters of the LCL have meanwhile strained to argue that, on the 
contrary, the legislation will bring benefits to workers and companies alike, protecting 
employees’ rights while increasing the sophistication of Chinese human resources 
managers.      
    
In this report, we do not assume a unity of interests between management and workers.  
We acknowledge that improvements in workers’ rights will necessarily come at a cost to 
some businesses.  But we also seek to understand what space exists for enterprises to 
grow within the law.  Businesses in China must ultimately learn to rely on more than 
wage cuts to make profits, and the sooner they find other sources of efficiency, the better.  
Thus, in order to gain a better understanding of the perspective of management in regards 
to China’s evolving labor protection regime, we pair extensive worker interviews with 
the results of 23 conversations with Chinese and foreign executives and managers from 
across the country.    
  
This discussion, it should be noted, is also set in the broader context of the course of the 
phenomenally dynamic Chinese economy. We hear with increasing frequency from the 
highest levels of the Chinese government the need for China to move from an economic 
model heavily dependent on exports to one in which the demand of the country's own 
internal market plays a larger role in economic growth. There are many complex factors 
involved in such a transition, but there is broad agreement that increasing the security and 
purchasing power of Chinese workers, as the new labor legislation aims to do, would 
contribute significantly to the growth of an internal market for goods and services, thus 
benefiting the economy overall.  
    
Our research is intended to serve as a resource for foreign NGOs, foundations, 
universities and unions that hope support to Chinese workers and engage productively in 
the country’s legislative process; for companies seeking a socially responsible path to 
success in China; and for Chinese labor advocates in need of empirical data to guide their 
efforts.   
    
 
                                                
17 Dong Baohua, “‘The Labor Contract Law’ Will Lead to a Situation of ‘Three Losses’” (‘Laodong hetong 
fa’ jiang lingzhi ‘san shu’ jumian), Dong Baohua’s Blog, 
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4fab7fbf01008lsn.html, January 22, 2008. 
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KEY FINDINGS  
    
In this report, we reaffirm the findings of several existing studies by NGOs, academics 
and city-level branches of the ACFTU. It departs from many of them, however, in its 
emphasis on migrant workers and in its data on how the LCL has affected different age 
groups, education, and work positions.  The following are a few of the report’s key 
findings: 
    
• More workers have signed contracts since the LCL went into effect, but the number 
with contracts is still exceedingly low, at least in the regions surveyed, considering 
that the law requires that all employees have a formal contract.   Sixty percent of 
the interviewees had a contract at the time of their interview; 53 percent said that 
they had contracts before the law went into effect. Many workers interviewed 
during the course of this research complained that their contracts lacked provisions 
required by the LCL.   
 
• Enrollment in work injury insurance has increased significantly.  Among 
interviewees, the percentage with insurance increased from 39.5 percent to 49.5 
percent after the LCL went into effect.   Again, this is still well below the 100 
percent required by law. 
 
• The law has helped older workers less than it has younger workers, as illustrated by 
the gradual decline by age in the number of workers with labor contracts and social 
insurance. While 66 percent of workers ages 16-24 had a labor contract at the time 
of their interviews, for example, this percentage dropped to 64 percent for ages 25-
32, 60 percent for ages 33-40, and 56 percent for workers ages 41-52.   
 
• In general, the workers interviewed relied on mass media such as television (64 
percent), newspapers (46.6 percent), and the Internet (44.7 percent) as their primary 
source of legal information.  Workers relied on informal sources, as well, such as 
friends (30.8 percent) and other workers (26.5 percent). Sources varied widely 
according to other variables, such as age and education, with older or less educated 
workers relying much more heavily on informal sources.   
 
• Labor protections seemed to vary widely by industry.  While our small sample size 
for some industries may have biased our results, we noted very sharp differences 
between, say, workers in the furniture and hardware sector, who were least likely to 
enjoy social insurance (35 percent) or contracts (50 percent), and, say, service 
sector workers, who fared the best in our survey (74 percent of whom had 
insurance). 
 
• Interviews with management revealed fear of certain provisions of the law, such as 
open-ended contracts, but also an appreciation of the stability that the LCL could 
bring to Chinese labor relations more generally. 
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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
These findings have led us to several conclusions and recommendations, several of which 
we elaborate on at the end of the report, that depart from the narrow results of our survey 
to draw on a range of policy discussions.   
 
• The battle to ensure that all workers have signed labor contracts is far from won.  
Authorities must bring more pressure to bear on noncompliant employers. 
 
Sixty percent of workers having contracts is not enough.  More migrant workers in 
particular must be brought into formal labor relationships.   One possible way to do 
so would be to introduce tougher criminal and civil sanctions against business 
owners who refuse to sign contracts. 
 
• Labor activists, government officials and trade union cadres must focus not only on 
contract coverage, but also the process of signing contracts. 
 
It is not uncommon for workers to sign blank contracts or foreign-language 
contracts or to have their contracts modified later without their consent.  Some 
workers interviewed even saw the quality of their contracts decline after the LCL 
went into effect.  The law provides new avenues for collective bargaining.  Further 
study is needed on how the union or other, less formal groupings of workers can 
make the best use of these avenues.  
 
• A multi-faceted approach to legal education is needed in order to reach older 
workers in particular. 
 
While the internet and other new media have great potential for publicizing the LCL 
and other laws, in order to reach as much of the migrant working class as possible, 
NGOs, the ACFTU and others may need to adopt more community-centered 
methods of organizing. 
 
• Access to legal assistance for workers must be expanded. 
 
Despite reforms, the legal process is still too costly for workers.   One means of 
making arbitration and courts more accessible would be to expand Shenzhen City’s 
experiment in attorney fee-shifting to other parts of the country.   
 
• Activists must monitor conditions in backward “nuts and bolts” factories. 
 
Fresh strategies are needed for consumer activists to monitor less “branded” parts 
of supply chains, such as the manufacturing of literally the nuts and bolts that go 
into finished products.   
 
• Responsible businesses can take advantage of certain aspects of the LCL.  
 
There is space for more business-side innovation on improving worker rights; the 
benefits of lower turnover in LCL-compliant enterprises has been emphasized 
before, but it needs to be emphasized more.   
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THE IMPACT OF THE LABOR CONTRACT LAW 
 
Existing Research 
    
Much ink has been spilled in analysis of China’s LCL, yet many of the resulting reports 
have, as noted in our introduction, centered on the law’s consequences for businesses. 
Yao Xianguo, Dean of the College of Public Management, Zhejiang University, for 
example, conducted a survey in 2008 that found that firms that were not compliant with 
existing legislation but that later came into compliance with the LCL experienced labor 
cost increases of 33 percent, while law-abiding firms saw increases of only 0.69 
percent.18 Such surveys are open to a number of different interpretations: both pro- and 
anti-LCL proponents can find fodder in Dean Yao’s findings.    
    
Other studies include research into the impact of the LCL by academics, city-level 
branches of the ACFTU and labor rights NGOs.  The Beijing Federation of Trade Unions 
(BFTU), for example, found that 96.2 percent of workers in the city had signed formal 
labor contracts by September 2008, a rise of 4.7 percentage points over the year before.19 
However, the BFTU survey focused on workers with local household registration rather 
than migrant workers. Roughly 30 percent of the city’s long-term residents (chang zhu 
renkou) lack a local Beijing urban registration (hukou).20 Only 32.8 percent of the 
migrant workers surveyed by the union had signed contracts, while the rate for all 
workers in the survey stood at 96.2 percent. 
 
A group of students at Nanjing University conducted an ambitious survey of working 
conditions in the several Yangtze River Delta cities during the financial crisis.  Among 
other findings, they discovered that 46.3 percent of workers in Wenzhou did not have 
contracts.21   
 
Around the same time as the BFTU survey was conducted, Tao Wenzhong of the Capital 
University of Business and Economics interviewed 972 workers and managers of 54 
enterprises in Beijing’s Chaoyang District on their experience of the Labor Contract 
Law.22  Similar to the union’s survey, he found that 93.9 percent of interviewees had 
signed formal labor contracts. Of Professor Tao’s interviewees, 5.6 percent were workers 
                                                
18 “Jobs, Yes, but a Return to the Sweatshop?” ChinaStakes, http://www.chinastakes.com/2008/12/jobs-
yes-but-a-return-to-the-sweatshop.html, December 30, 2008. 
19 “Report on the Situation of Beijing City’s Implementation of ‘The Labor Contract Law of the People’s 
Republic of China’”   (Guanyu beijing shi guanche ‘zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa’ 
qingkuangde diaoyan), Youxiu Lunwen Pingxuan, 
http://yxlw.acftu.org/template/6/file.jsp?cid=16&aid=330, February 26, 2009. 
20 “Outsiders Make Up Stable Portion of the Long-Term Population of Beijing’s Six Districts” (Beijing 
changzhu renkou wailai zhan sancheng juji liu liu qu de jingwai jingnei shuliang teping), Xinhua, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-11/14/content_12452901.htm, November 14, 2009.
  
21 Wang Chen, “An Investigation of the Conditions of Rural Migrant Workers’ Rights During the Financial 
Crisis” (Jinrong weiji beijing xiade nongmingong quanyi zhuangkuang diaocha), Laodong falü zanzhu 
tongxun, 2009. 
22 Tao Wenzhong, “The Situation of Labor Relations After the Enactment of the Labor Contract Law” 
(Laodong hetong fa shishi hou de laodong guanxi zhuangkuang), forthcoming paper, 2009. 
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with Beijing household registration but from rural areas of Beijing, while 9.1 percent 
were workers from rural areas entirely outside the municipality.   
    
Professor Tao also found a drop in workers’ satisfaction with their contracts since the 
LCL went into effect.23 This echoes the criticisms of some workers in our own survey, as 
described below.  It also matches the findings of the Shenzhen Dagongzhe Migrant 
Worker Center, which released a report in 2009 documenting precisely this 
phenomenon.24 The Dagongzhe report has justly been cited frequently in the international 
media.25    
  
Dagongzhe interviewed 320 workers around Shenzhen, most of them migrants, and 
discovered that businesses were engaging in a number of different tricks to circumvent 
the LCL, including using English-language only contracts, blank or covered-over 
contracts.  Employers divided contracts into two parts, with half a worker’s wage on each 
part and the overtime only calculated off of one of them, resulting in workers receiving 
half the overtime wages owed them.  Many companies employed a worker for 6-day 
weeks at 6.7 hours per day as a means of getting around overtime requirements.  Most 
importantly, 26.6 percent of workers surveyed still worked without contracts. 
 
Research Method  
   
The 367 workers interviewed for this report came from six roughly geographical areas: 
Shenzhen, Dongguan, Zhuhai, and Guangzhou in Pearl River Delta, as well as Suzhou in 
Yangtze River Delta (see Table 1).   
 
Interviewees included both individuals who had been in contact with local NGOs, as well 
as workers randomly approached outside factory gates and in marketplaces. Questions 
covered workers’ labor contracts and social insurance, as well as their views on the utility 
of the law overall to protect their rights.  Several dozen surveys had to be discarded 
because they were illegible or too incomplete to be usable.   
 
Given this selection process, it is difficult to generalize from our results to China’s 
migrant labor nationwide, yet local, in-depth reports such as this one are key to 
developing a better understanding of LCL implementation at local levels, particularly 
within critical regions such as the Pearl River Delta and Yangtze River Delta.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
23 Presentation by activist at conference, February 2009. 
24 Shenzhen Dagongzhe Migrant Worker Centre, “New Ongoing Violations of Labour Contract Law in 
China,” translated by Workers Empowerment and IHLO, Worker Empowerment, 
http://www.workerempowerment.org/en/newsletter/18, June 12, 2009. 
25 See, for example, “Chinese Labor Laws Buckle as Economy Darkens,” Reuters, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE51335C20090204, February 4, 2009. 
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Table 1. Interview Locations 
   
Location  Number Interviewed  Percentage  
   
Shenzhen - North  162  44.1  
Shenzhen - South  73  19.9  
Zhuhai and Dongguan  12  3.3  
Guangzhou  77  21.0  
Suzhou (Yangtze River Delta) 43 11.7 
Total  367  100  
 
General characteristics   
    
Table 2 shows that the average age of migrant workers interviewed during the course of 
this research was 26, with approximately three quarters of the interview respondents 
being male and one- quarter female.  This gender ratio does not reflect the overall gender 
balance in the Pearl River Delta or Yangtze River Delta, as many factories hire only 
women workers and it is estimated that women make up a majority of employees in some 
sectors.26  Our imbalance is likely a result of the fact that males outnumber females at the 
non-profits that helped us with this study.  We hope future researchers will fill this 
serious gap in the report. 
    
Most workers interviewed for this research had attained a middle school education, with 
some high school experience. The Law of the People's Republic of China on Compulsory 
Education provides for schooling up to and including middle school or nine years of 
schooling. Migrants tend to finish their schooling after middle school, if not before, in 
order to begin searching for work.   Approximately half of the interviewees came from 
five provinces: Hunan, Henan, Sichuan, Hubei and Jiangxi. These are provinces are all 
major exporters of migrant labor.    
 
The vast majority of workers we interviewed (all but 10 percent) were employed in some 
type of manufacturing, with the remainder in service industries. Moreover, within the 
manufacturing sector, the majority of interviewees were employed in electronics, 
followed by footwear, battery, and machine production (See Table 2).   These industries 
are all major engines of growth in the two regions surveyed.27 
    
However, not all the workers we interviewed were unskilled laborers.  Identifying 
interviewees’ precise work positions was difficult, but we estimate that 37.2 had office 
jobs and 62.8 percent had manual jobs.  Roughly 15 percent of the interviewees engaged 
in activities like quality control (pinguan), operations and logistics management, (yunying 
guanli), and “assistant manager of guest services” (kefu fujingli).  Again, though, all were 
“migrants,” as they were employed outside their home provinces. 
                                                
26 Pun Ngai, Made In China: Women Factory Workers In a Global Workplace, Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2005. 
27 “Gross Industrial Output for PRD in 2002, Selected Industries,” The Greater Pearl River Delta, 
http://www.thegprd.com/about%5Cindustry.html, accessed on February 12, 2010. 
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While the workers interviewed for this research were employed in a number of different 
companies within the industries mentioned above, three specific corporations stand out, 
as they employed approximately 12% of all the workers: the Hantai Shoe Factory in 
Shenzhen, the Haizhi Battery Corporation (LLC) in Huizhou, and the Shenzhen Xinbang 
Transportation Company.  
 
The Hantai Shoe Factory in Shenzhen (Hantai) is a footwear production company, which 
counts among its clients such well-known companies as Wal-Mart, Sketchers, and Fila 
and employs approximately 4,000 individuals, down approximately 50 percent as a result 
of the financial crisis. Hantai has previously been the subject of reports chronicling labor 
abuses within the company, such as a 2008 report by China Labor Watch, which focused 
on the factory’s relationship with Wal-Mart.28  
 
The Haizhi (also called Haze) Battery Corporation in Huizhou is a US-invested 
corporation, established in 2003, that employs over 2,000 workers in the Guangdong city 
of Huizhou. The Shenzhen Xinbang Transportation Company, located in Futian district 
Shangbu Industrial Zone of Shenzhen, is a shipping company with a fleet of over 600 
vehicles, employing over 5,000 personnel.29    
 
Table 2. Interview Respondents General Characteristics 
   
Average Age  26  
Sex  74.8% Male  
25.2% Female  
Average Education  Middle School Graduate  
Some High School Experience  
Home Province  Hunan (22.5%)  
Henan (11.1%)  
Sichuan (9.6%)  
Hubei (9.2%)  
Jiangxi (7.0)  
Industry  Electronics (24.2)  
Footwear (13.6)  
Service Industry (10.1)  
Work Type  37.2 Office 
62.8 Manual 
Labor Contract  53% Before LCL  
61% After LCL  
Worker Injury Insurance  39.5% Before LCL  
50.5% After LCL  
Social Insurance  41.2% Before LCL  
49.7% After LCL  
                                                
28 See, for example China Labor Watch, “Domination of World’s Leading Retailer Wal-Mart: ‘Save 
Money, Live Better’:  Workers’ Nightmare,” July 15, 2008, available at 
http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/20080715Wal.htm. 
29 See the Xinbang Shipping Corporation Website, http://www.xbwl.cn/website/main.jsp. 
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Protection Under the Law   
    
How are migrant workers being protected under the PRC’s emerging labor protection 
regime?  This project collected data on three key issues facing migrant workers in regards 
to their legal labor rights in China: access to a labor contract, the ability to obtain work 
injury insurance, and access to social insurance.   
 
Access to Labor Contracts   
    
Labor contracts are often considered to be central to workers’ legal rights in China.  As in 
other countries, they delineate workers’ terms of employment, including salaries, hours, 
and overtime benefits.  Equally importantly, however, contracts help to prove a labor 
relationship between an employee and his or her employer (laodong guanxi) should any 
disputes arise, thus paving the way for more smooth labor arbitration or court 
proceedings. The LCL states clearly that each and every worker must sign a contract.  In 
fact, this is one of the central accomplishments of the law, if not the central 
accomplishment. 
 
Our research suggests that the number of workers with contracts has grown somewhat 
since the law’s enactment. Sixty percent of the workers interviewed for our report said 
they had a labor contract after the implementation of the LCL on January 1, 2008.  In 
contrast, only 53 percent interviewees said they had had a contract before the law. 
However, given the importance of contracts to the LCL, it is surprising that a full year 
after the law went into effect to great fanfare more workers have not been able to sign 
documents attesting to their labor relationship.      
 
Moreover, the percentage of interviewed workers with contracts varied somewhat when 
other variables were taken into account, most notably the age of the workers. Older 
workers, for example, were less likely to have a labor contract than younger workers. 
While 66 percent of workers ages 16-24 currently had a labor contract—again, still a low 
number considering that the law mandated that 100 percent have contracts—this 
percentage dropped to 64 percent for ages 25-32, 60 percent (the average percentage) for 
ages 33-40, and 56 percent for workers ages 41-52.  Education had little impact on the 
likelihood of signing a contract: only 60% of workers with a college degree had signed a 
one.   
    
Even workers who do sign labor contracts may not be protected from exploitation, as 
labor contracts are often nothing more than blank templates, signed by workers and filled 
out later by employers. Many contracts simply include a list of worker responsibilities.  
As one worker described during his interview, “The contract I signed with my current 
factory is not legally formal, and not even as good as my previous one.”30  Of course, 
without true collective bargaining, employers may simply refuse to hire workers who 
steadfastly demand to sign a labor contract.  The process of signing contracts is as 
important as contract rates. 
                                                
30 Interview #187, Shenzhen, March 10, 2009. 
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Work Injury Insurance and Social Insurance 
    
Access to injury insurance is also an important issue for migrant workers. Dangerous 
work environments, the use of heavy machinery without proper safety training, long 
hours that leave workers tired and negligent, and the constant push for greater speed and 
productivity all contribute to labor injuries. Migrants tend to be employed in small private 
enterprises that lag far behind capital-intensive, state-owned enterprises and even private 
enterprises that were formally state-owned enterprises in safety precautions.31  By some 
estimates, migrants account for over 80 percent of the total number of injuries and deaths 
in mining, construction, and manufacturing operations.32  
 
Access to “social insurance” (shehui baoxian), a catch-all category that includes 
pensions, work injury insurance, medical insurance, maternity insurance and 
unemployment insurance, is also an increasingly contentious issue for migrant workers. 
By law, employers are required to contribute to the government-run pension program, 
regardless of whether their employees are migrants or employees with a local household 
registration (hukou). However, migrant workers’ position in the current system is 
problematic for a number of reasons.  First, many employers still do not pay into the 
system despite collecting contributions from their workers. Second, the high mobility and 
large turnover rate for migrant labor makes it difficult to benefit from this system.  Until 
very recently, migrant workers could not transfer their accounts to their new place of 
work, or even to their place of birth, thus limiting the utility of the social security system 
to these workers even if they did pay into the system.33 The system is currently changing, 
with more transfers already allowed and a completely new system is expected soon.34   
 
The LCL deals very little with work injury insurance or social insurance, as these are 
covered by other legislation, such as the State Council’s 2003 Regulations on Work 
Injury Insurance.35  However, it requires that a company pay compensation to any 
employee who resigns because the company did not provide him or her with insurance.36  
The law also mandates that all contracts include employers’ insurance commitments37 
                                                
31 Meei-shia Chen and Anita Chan, “Occupational Health and Safety in China: The Case of State-Managed 
Enterprises,” International Journal of Health Services, Volume 40, Issue 1, 2010. 
32 China Labor Watch, “The Long March: Surveys and Case Studies of Work Injuries in the Pearl River 
Delta Region,” March 2007, pp. 2. 
33 “Systematic Government Theft of Migrant Workers’ Retirement Pension,” China Labor News 
Translation, http://www.clntranslations.org/article/31/systematic-government-theft-of-migrant-workers-
retirement-pensions,  July 2008.  
  
34 “New Pension Fund Rules Benefit Migrant Workers,” CCTV.com, 
http://english.cctv.com/program/bizchina/20091230/102000.shtml, December 30, 2009; “Draft Law of 
Social Insurance Draws Nationwide Debate,” Xinhua News English [Online], 20 February 2009, available 
at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/news/Legislation/2009-02/20/content_1471096.htm; Congressional 
Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2009, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing 
Office), 10, October 2009, pp. 69. 
35 State Council, Regulations on Work Injury Insurance (No. 375), April 27, 2003. 
36 Labor Contract Law, Articles 38, 46. 
37 Labor Contract Law, Article 17. 
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and requires that the labor administrative departments of local governments “perform 
surveillance and inspection” of “employers’ participation in social insurance” and “other 
labor surveillance issues as prescribed by relevant laws and regulations.”38  In this way, 
the legislation reaffirms provisions in the 1994 Labor Law, such as the right of workers to 
social insurance39 and the requirement that all workers receive compensation for work 
injuries and illnesses.40  
 
According to the workers interviewed during the course of this research, only 39.5 
percent had injury insurance before 2008, compared to the 49.5 percent who currently 
have injury insurance, an increase in coverage of 10 percent. The major gains in access to 
labor injury insurance seem to have come largely for younger workers, as only 29.6 
percent of workers ages 16-24 had access to injury insurance before 2008, while 52.4 
percent currently have access.    
 
Despite the systematic exclusion of migrant works from full access to the current 
government pension system, the percentage of workers having social insurance has risen 
by approximately 8 percentage points since the beginning of 2008, from 41.2 percent 
before to 49.7 percent after. Again, younger workers have benefited the most, with 
increases in social insurance workers in the youngest age group (16-24) improving 16 
percentage points since 2008.   
  
As with the rate at which workers are signing contracts, these improvements should be 
considered in the light of the fact that by law all of China’s workers should have both 
work injury and social insurance, not half of China’s workers. 
 
Industry to Industry Comparison   
    
Our research was biased toward certain industries.  Almost a quarter of our interviewees 
worked in the electronics sector, for example, while only 6 percent worked in logistics.  
Yet the differences in labor conditions between the main sectors in our sample were 
intriguing.  They suggest the need for a targeted, industry-specific approach to 
strengthening enforcement of the LCL. 
 
While 60 percent of all workers in the sample had access to a labor contract, only 50 
percent of those working in the furniture and hardware industries had access to such 
contracts. Workers in the furniture and hardware industry were also significantly less 
likely to enjoy social insurance, with only 35 percent of workers in this industry reporting 
that they had such insurance, compared to roughly 50 percent of all workers.  
 
In addition, workers in the electronics and footwear industries, two of the largest 
industries in the sample, and two important industries in the Pearl and Yangtze River 
Deltas, had slightly below average rates of work injury insurance. Forty-seven percent of 
                                                
38 Labor Contract Law, Article 74. 
39 Labor Contract Law, Article 3. 
40 Labor Contract Law, Article 73. 
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electronics workers and 45 percent of footwear workers had access to such insurance, 
compared, again, to roughly 50 percent of all the workers interviewed from all sectors.   
    
Workers employed in service industries (including logistics and transportation), however, 
had higher than average rates of access to both work injury and social insurance.  Fifty-
eight percent of service workers reported having work injury insurance, while 74 percent 
reported having social insurance. More in-depth research on these differences is needed.  
 
How Workers Are Learning About the Law  
    
How do Chinese migrant workers obtain legal information?  This is an important 
question for NGO activists, union cadres, and labor officials alike.  One response to the 
shortcomings in labor law implementation must be an even greater effort at educating 
workers about their rights.  Of course, information about the letter of the law is not 
enough; workers must learn how to use laws and legal channels effectively.  They must, 
moreover, make demands based on interests that go beyond any single regulation. What, 
though, is the most efficient way of reaching them?  
 
In general, the workers we interviewed (using a multiple-choice format) tended to obtain 
legal information through traditional media sources like television (64 percent) and 
newspapers  (46.6 percent), as well as newer mass media, such as the internet (44.7 
percent). Yet the sources that workers accessed varied significantly according to their age 
and education. While the internet played an important role in helping younger, more 
educated workers obtain legal information, for example, for older, less educated workers, 
use of this resource was extremely limited.  
 
Specifically, although 46.6 percent of the entire sample relied on the Internet, only 20 
percent of workers above the age of 30 used this resource, compared to 50.5 percent of 
those under 30. Moreover, while approximately 77 percent of workers with a university 
or polytechnical degree reported using the internet to obtain legal information, only half 
of those with high school experience or a high school degree and only 20 percent of those 
with a middle school degree or middle school experience did so. No workers with an 
education level below middle school reported using the internet to obtain information.  
 
Older workers relied on personal ties for legal knowledge.  A full 37.5 percent of 
interviewees over 30 cited friends as a source for information, compared to 29.6 percent 
of those under 30, while 40 percent of older workers got their knowledge from other 
workers, compared to 24.3 of younger workers.  The pattern held for other direct, 
personal sources of information: NGOs (25 percent versus 21.4 percent), family members 
(20 percent versus 16.5 percent) and people from the same hometown (laoxiang) (20 
percent versus 16 percent). 
  
New technologies are a useful resource for China’s migrant workers. They can spread 
information quickly and facilitate collective responses to specific problems.  However, 
given that most migrants attain only a middle school education, the last level of education 
supported by the state, and few workers with a middle school education or less get their 
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legal information online, the internet is clearly not the most efficient means of 
disseminating information regarding the LCL and other labor regulations to large 
segments of the migrant labor population. 
 
Table 3. Migrant Workers’ Sources of Legal Information 
   
  Total 
Sample  
Younger 
Workers 
(<30)  
Older 
Workers 
(>30)  
Education:  
Elementary 
or Less  
Education: 
Middle School  
Education: 
High School  
Education: 
University  
Television  64%  63.6%  65%  44.4%  73.7%  48.4%  64.6%  
Newspapers  46.6%  48%  45%  11.1%  38.4%  48.4%  59.5%  
Internet  44.7%  50.5%  20.0%  0.00%  20.2%  50.0%  77.2%  
Friends  30.8%  29.6%  37.5%  22.2%  27.3%  25.8%  30.1%  
Workers  26.5%  24.3%  40%  55.6%  30.3%  24.2%  18.9%  
NGOs  22.1%  21.4%  25.0%  11.1%  20.2%  24.2%  21.5%  
Family Members  17%  16.5%  20.0  33.3%  13.1%  12.9%  21.5%  
Hometown 
Associates  
16.6%  16.0%  20.0%  33.3%  17.2%  14.5%  13.9%  
Radio  11.9%  12.1%  7.5%  0.00%  5.0%  9.7%  21.5%  
Labor Bureau  11.7%  12.1%  12.5%  0.00%  9.0%  17.7%  11.4%  
Government 
Legal Aid 
Centers  
8.7%  6.8%  17.5%  11.1%  10.1%  12.9%  3.8%  
Note: Workers were allowed to choose more than one source 
 
Workers’ Views of the Labor Contract Law: A Combination of Hope and Doubt   
  
Finally, to what extent do workers have faith in the LCL’s ability to protect their rights? 
In response to our questions, approximately 33 percent of the workers “completely 
agreed” (wanquan tongyi) that signing a labor contract would safeguard their legal rights, 
while almost 50 percent of the sample “agreed” (tongyi). This general support for the 
legislation remained high among workers who had direct experience with labor law.  
Approximately 80 percent of the 100 workers who themselves had gone through labor 
arbitration or the court system still supported the idea that the LCL could help workers 
defend their rights.   
 
However, this surface optimism was mixed with doubts over enforcement of the law, as 
well as pragmatism about tactics. When workers were allowed to express themselves in 
more detail during the in-depth portion of interviews, they often provided a more nuanced 
analysis of their views. Even those workers who “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that labor 
contracts could protect their rights expressed strong reservations.  
 
The work of other researches has also shown this same coexistence of support and 
cynicism regarding Chinese labor laws and governmental and semi-governmental labor 
institutions.  In a study of Labor Arbitration Committees in Dalian City in Northeast 
China, E. Patrick McDermott found high levels of satisfaction with the arbitration process 
on the part of workers (and businesses) he interviewed, as well as a strong willingness by 
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workers to recommend the process to others.41  In a survey of Shanghai workers, though, 
Mary Gallagher noted how workers became more cynical about legal channels even as 
they resolved to use arbitration and courts again and even as their sense of their own 
efficacy rose.  She dubbed this condition “informed disenchantment.”42   
 
Our research shows somewhat more resilient faith in the overall legal system among 
workers than in Gallagher’s analysis.  Yet some of the comments below point to more 
doubt about the legal system than that found by McDermott. Given Gallagher’s focus on 
Shanghai, McDermott’s focus on Dalian, and our research in the Pearl and Yangtze River 
Deltas, these variations may be a function of local conditions. They may also be related 
to the timing of the different studies, as our interviews were conducted approximately one 
year after the LCL’s enactment, while Gallagher and McDermott carried out their 
research before the law went into effect. 
 
Pragmatism about tactics was strong among our interviewees.  Many interviewees 
expressed a preference for collective solutions to labor disputes.  For example, one 
worker, who “agreed” that signing a contract could protect his rights went on to explain:   
 
“It should help [referring to the LCL], but it’s hard to say, because as a migrant 
worker, very often you can't compete with the factory. If you’re in a group (qunti) 
it’s possible to have more influence, but I still believe the Labor Contract Law is 
fair.”43   
    
The most potent expressions of collective action are strikes or protests, which can be 
quite effective.  A recent survey of 100 recent labor protests found that “in only three 
cases did the workers clearly lose either by having their demands rejected or by being 
sacked after taking protest action;” in 37 cases, workers’ demands were “fully or partially 
met;” in 21 cases, “the local government intervened but with no clear result;” and in the 
remaining 39 cases, “the final outcome was unclear.”44   
 
But not all collective solutions necessarily involve public displays of resistance.  Workers 
may bring successive, individual legal cases rather than a single collective case (which is 
often exceedingly difficult if not impossible).  They may combine a legal action with 
collective and direct expressions of discontent to managers inside the workplace.  
Moreover, the emotional backing of a community is often needed for an individual to have 
the strength to go through with an individual case.  
 
Many of our interviewees expressed dismay in the job done by labor regulators.  Despite 
“strongly agreeing” with the idea that the law can protect workers’ rights, one worker 
                                                
41 E. Patrick McDermott, forthcoming paper in Journal of Labor and Industry. 
42 Mary E. Gallagher, “Mobilizing the Law: ‘Informed Disenchantment’ and the Development of Legal 
Consciousness,” Law and Society Review, December 2006. 
43 Interview #148, Shenzhen. 
44 China Labour Bulletin, “Going it Alone: The Workers’ Movement in China (2007-2008),” 
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/files/share/File/research_reports/workers_movement_07-08.pdf, July 9, 2009. 
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stated:   
 
“While overall workers' rights are safeguarded better than before, government 
functional departments (zhengfu zhineng bumen) don't do a good job investigating 
violations of the law. Workers are disadvantaged group in society (ruoshi qunti).”45    
    
Indeed, China’s labor inspectors are too few (albeit more numerous in proportion to 
China’s population than are American inspectors to the U.S. population)46 and 
underfunded.  In a context somewhat different from the Pearl River Delta’s factory 
inspectors, 48 mine safety inspectors in Hunan collectively tendered their resignations in 
May 2009 because they said that they could not “meet the tough rules on safety.”47  Too 
often, the inspectorate can only react after the fact to problems, if at all. 
 
Workers we interviewed were also skeptical of legal implementation in China more 
generally.  As one said, “[The LCL] might be good. However, in some factories, the 
Labor Contract Law is not really being enforced on the ground.”48  Two other workers 
expressed similar sentiments regarding the importance of proper implementation:  “It 
might be better. But the government does not strictly enforce it and does not implement it 
thoroughly.”49    
 
Some workers expressed hope that the LCL could protect them, even though this hope 
appeared to contradict their prior experiences:   
  
“We all come from economically backward regions, and came to Guangdong to 
take care of our family. However, in Guangdong we've all had experienced with 
bosses who embezzle and flee with our salary, and have no guarantee of our wages. 
Now, the Labor Contract Law will fundamentally guarantee our legal rights.”50   
    
Workers’ support, however clouded by doubt and balanced by harsh experiences, could 
go a long way in promoting the transparency and stability in the labor market that China 
seeks. However, absent full implementation of the law, many workers will continue to be 
subject to extreme exploitation, and doubt both the local and central level government’s 
commitment to the rule of law. One worker in Shenzhen put it best:   
 
“It will become better if the government can strictly enforce [the law]. If the 
                                                
45 Interview #232, Longhua. 
46 There is one inspector for every 35,000 workers in China, versus one for every 66,258 workers in the 
United States; the International Labour Organization’s benchmark is 1 per 10,000.  See Meei-shia Chen and 
Anita Chan, “Occupational Health and Safety in China,” 2010; AFL-CIO, “Number of OSHA Inspectors 
by State Compared with ILO Benchmark Number of Labor Inspectors,” 
http://www.aflcio.org/issues/safety/memorial/upload/_40A.pdf, accessed on February 10, 2010. 
47 Stephen Wong, “China's Mine Inspectors Bite the Dust,” Asia Times Online, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KF05Ad01.html, June 5, 2009. 
48 Interview #178, Shenzhen. 
49 Interview #1128, Shenzhen. 
50 Interview #549, Guangzhou. 
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government does not respond, many migrant workers will be gone.”51   
 
Businesses’ Views on the Labor Contract Law   
  
In addition to interviews with the low income workers most affected by the LCL, our 
research attempted to capture the viewpoints of management and white-collar workers on 
the legislation, particularly their sense of how it would impact the business community 
and the Chinese economy more generally.   
 
A total of 23 interviews were conducted with management and white-collar workers 
across a number of industries in Guangdong, Zhejiang, Beijing, and Shanghai in the 
Yangtze River Delta.  Interviewees were contacted through personal and professional 
relationships.  Unlike the majority of workers interviewed during the course of this 
research, all respondents had a university education, and most were relatively 
knowledgeable of the LCL’s details.  Their views, however, varied widely.   
  
Pressures on Businesses 
    
Some management-side interviewees warned of doomsday scenarios as a result of the 
new legislation, while others expressed more optimistic views regarding the law's long-
term impact. One manager working in a business communications company in Zhejiang, 
for example, offered up the following:   
    
“It’s hard to say [about the impact of the LCL]. In my opinion, the Labor  
Contract Law will increase the minimum wage for workers and increase labor costs 
for companies. Perhaps, enterprises will reduce the number of people they hire in 
order to cut costs. Or, perhaps, because of the increase in pay... companies will 
have to decrease the quality of their goods, such that they are of less quality than 
what was promised. This will reduce the market share for Chinese goods in both the 
international and domestic markets, and ultimately influence the state economy. Of 
course, this is a simple assumption, and we have to look at the practical 
implementation when evaluating any legislation.”52   
    
Others suggested that certain specific aspects of the LCL, most notably those clauses 
providing workers with access to a non-fixed term contract after signing two fixed term 
contracts, place an undue burden on enterprises.53 One interviewee, a consultant in  
Shanghai, argued that very often it is the workers who are at fault for breaching the terms 
of labor contracts and that the law should be reformed to reflect this situation54 (we 
would argue that the law is already quite clear about the obligations of both parties and, 
judging from the results of our survey, that employers are more likely than workers to be 
in violation). 
                                                
51 Interview #1150, Shenzhen. 
52 Interview Group II 002 Zhejiang, December 8, 2009. 
53 Labor Contract Law, Article 14. 
54 Interview Group II 001, Shanghai, November 13, 2009. 
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Upsides for Businesses 
 
Yet those managers who were interviewed during the course of the research did not 
believe all aspects of the LCL were harmful. One business management consultant in  
Shanghai, for example, expressed support for clauses in the law that protect business 
secrets when workers leave a company.55    
    
“A few individuals take company trade or technology secrets (such as client 
information), sometimes for profit, and in violation of the labor contract's clauses 
on ‘changing jobs’ (tiaocao). This can lead to losses for the original employer. In 
this instance the restrictive clauses within the Labor Contract Law are very 
necessary.”56    
    
More broadly, many managers spoke approvingly of the law’s ability to “stabilize” 
(wending) and “standardize” (guifan) industrial relations in the long term.  Over half used 
these terms or said that the LCL could end up reducing “social contradictions” (shehui 
maodun). In the opinion of one white collar worker employed in finance,  
 
“In the long term, yes, [the legislation will have a positive impact], because it can 
stabilize the labor market, provide a stable supply of labor, and guarantee social 
stability, and be helpful in promoting domestic consumption and restructuring the 
economy. In the short term, it will give some companies a lot of pressure, 
especially those with thin profit margins.”57  
 
There is evidence that such macro sentiments may be useful on a micro level.  For 
example, a 2008 Booz Allen Hamilton study of firms operating in China found that 33 
percent cited “poor employee retention” as a prime reason for lost competitiveness.58  A 
recent report released by Business for Social Responsibility (BSR) and the Levi Strauss 
(LS) Foundation meanwhile describes a pilot program wherein a Vietnamese factory 
partnered with local NGO to provide workers with legal training and include the workers 
in a “Project Management Team” that strove to resolve a series of abuses discovered in a 
baseline analysis of conditions at the plant.  As a result, the workforce stabilized after a 
sharp fall the year before and turnover fell from 6 percent to 3 percent; the company in 
turn gained from greater worker input on efficiencies.59   
 
Obviously, it is not the role of labor activists to ensure workplace stability.  But greater 
appreciation of the benefits of labor law among employers is a good thing.  
 
                                                
55 Labor Contract Law, Article 23. 
56 Interview Group II 001. 
57 Interview Group II 007, Shanghai, December 12, 2009. 
58 Christoph Bliss, Ronald Haddock, Conrad Winkler, and Kaj Grichnik, “China’s Shifting Competitive  
Equation: How Multinational Manufacturers Must Respond,” 
http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/Chinas_Shifting_Competitive_Equation.pdf, March 4, 2008. 
59 Business for Social Responsibility, “Moving the Needle: Protecting the Rights of Garment Factory 
Workers,” http://www.bsr.org/reports/BSR_LeviStraussFoundation2009.pdf, October 2009. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Our report shows the complex ways in which the LCL has impacted society, especially 
the lives of migrant workers.  The law has had very different impacts for young versus 
old workers, service employees versus manufacturing employees, and, of course, labor 
versus management.  This obvious fact calls for more multi-faceted strategies aimed at 
strengthening the LCL's implementation.  Below are a few suggestions. They are meant 
as a starting point to further conversation, yet they may be extremely useful in helping to 
move beyond simple, formal legal training for migrant workers, and towards a more 
practical understanding of how to use the law and empower workers within this growing 
labor rights protection regime.   
  
The battle to ensure that all workers have signed labor contracts is far from won.  
Authorities must bring more pressure to bear on noncompliant employers. 
 
Despite the extraordinary level of attention that the LCL received even before its 
enactment, large numbers of employers clearly still refuse to sign contracts with their 
employees or provide basic social and work injury insurance.   The LCL makes notable 
advances in terms of replacing fines to the state with mandates that companies 
compensate workers themselves for various infractions.  For example, Article 82 states, 
“If an employer fails to conclude a labor contract in written form with a worker in more 
than one month but less than one year after the date of starting to use him, it shall pay the 
worker double amount of his salary every month.” However, attacks on the law by 
prominent businesspeople and fickle local government attitudes toward implementation, 
especially during the early months of the global financial crisis, may have emboldened 
lawbreaking employers to continue to chart their own course.60  Implementing guidelines 
promulgated nationally on September 18, 2008 also loosened the LCL’s conditions on 
firing workers, among other things. 
 
Stiffer criminal and civil penalties directed at individual owners could speed 
implementation of the LCL’s main provisions, delivering better protections for workers 
and leveling the playing field for law-abiding companies. At present, the law already 
states that bosses can be “investigated for criminal liabilities” for forced labor, violence 
against workers, and especially dangerous working environments.61 During the recently-
concluded meeting of the National People’s Congress, the ACFTU further proposed that 
                                                
60 For example, Zhang Yin, head of the Nine Dragons paper company ignited fierce debate by criticizing 
the LCL during the 2008 meeting of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; see “Rich 
CPPCC Member Kicks Up Storm,” Xinhua via China Daily, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008npc/2008-03/10/content_6521877.htm, March 10, 2008. 
Anecdotal stories of government back-tracking abound; see, for example, Dan Harris, “China's New Labor 
Contract Law. Harmonized Out Of Existence?” China Law Blog, 
http://www.chinalawblog.com/2008/12/chinas_new_labor_contract_law_3.html, December 8, 2008.  
Guangdong weakened penalties against employers in the wake of the financial crisis in an especially 
controversial way; see “Guangdong Inspectorate: Enterprise Managers Need Not be Arrested for Ordinary 
Crimes” (Guangdong jiancha yuan: qiye laozong she yiban fanzui ke bu kouzhu), China.com.cn, 
http://www.china.com.cn/news/txt/2009-01/07/content_17068446.htm, January 7, 2009. 
61 Labor Contract Law, Article 88. 
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the country’s “criminal code be revised to specifically target employers who flee their 
responsibilities to pay back-pay.”62  Such penalties could be extended to failures to sign 
contracts.  They would have to be sustained, though.  Short crackdowns, like those 
launched following revelations of slave labor in Shanxi brick kilns, have delivered 
dramatic headlines but not final resolutions to problems.63 
 
Labor activists, government officials and trade union cadres must focus not only on 
contract coverage, but also the process of signing contracts. 
 
Several of our interviewees decried the poor quality of their contracts.  As noted, their 
experiences echo the findings of a survey conducted by Dagongzhe, which found large 
numbers of blank contracts, foreign-language contracts, covered-over contracts and 
contracts with illegal conditions.  Clearly, simply having a contract is not enough.  The 
quality of a contract is also important, and the greatest guarantee of quality is an equal 
bargaining relationship between employers and employees.  Better yet, workers should 
bargain collectively with their bosses. 
 
The ACFTU was instrumental in the drafting and passage of the law and gained new 
space to bargain on behalf of workers through the LCL’s extensive articles dealing with 
collective contracts.  Subsequent laws, such as Shenzhen’s Regulations on the Growth 
and Development of Harmonious Labor Relations even encouraged the union to stand on 
the side of workers in the event of a strike, a dramatic step forward in a country that 
removed the right to strike from its constitution in 1982 (but, it should be emphasized, 
never actively banned strikes, either).  At the outset of the financial crisis, the union 
appeared to put collective bargaining on hold.64  Now, with the worst of the crisis 
apparently behind China, reports suggest that the ACFTU is ready to revisit the issue.65  
At the urging of its citywide union federation, Guangzhou is contemplating new rules that 
would require employers to regularly engage in collective bargaining with unions who 
demand it—or face fines.66   
 
Who is best situated to advance collective bargaining?  There is considerable doubt 
among observers of Chinese labor relations as to the national-level ACFTU’s willingness 
to seriously confront employers; highly publicized union organizing campaigns, such as 
the one launched in Chinese Wal-Mart stores in 2006, have resulted in weak contracts.67  
                                                
62 Raymong Li, “Unions Target Bosses Who Dodge Back Pay,” South China Morning Post, March 10, 
2010. 
63 China Labour Bulletin,“Brick Factories in Hubei Continue to Use Forced Labour Despite ‘Crackdown,’” 
http://www.china-labour.org.hk/en/node/100665, January 29, 2010. 
64
 IHLO, “Guangdong Provincial Trade Union Suspends Collective Wage Negotiations,” 
http://www.ihlo.org/LRC/W/271108.html, November 2008. 
65 
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Qiao Jian of the China Institute of Industrial Relations argues that enterprise-level union 
cadres, often derided as stooges of management and local governments, are actually more 
“member-oriented” than acknowledged and eager to play a more active role on behalf of 
workers.68  Others have hailed the example of Wenling City in Zhejiang, whose trade 
union council negotiated an industry-wide wage agreement with the city’s woolen textile 
mills in 2004,69 though the continued practical impact of that agreement is unclear. More 
research is needed on workers’ own attitudes toward collective bargaining and what 
avenues are available for workers to directly access the process, possibly aided by NGOs 
or informal workers’ associations. 
 
A multi-faceted approach to legal education is needed in order to reach older workers 
in particular. 
  
Young migrant workers have clearly benefited the most from the LCL.  They are most to 
have signed labor contracts and to enjoy work injury insurance and social security.  It is 
probably not a coincidence that young workers are also the most likely to use the internet 
to access legal information.  However, we have also observed that, with the exception of 
those older workers with specific questions relating to their own jobs, attendees at NGO-
sponsored legal trainings tend be young.   We suspect the same is true for government-
run legal aid centers.   
  
Clearly, it is vitally important for good legal information to reach those who are just 
beginning their careers.  However, older workers still compose a large portion of the 
migrant workforce.  According to a 2006 State Council research report on migrant 
workers, 61 percent of migrants are aged 16-30; 23 percent are aged 31-40; and 16 
percent are 41 or older.70  Young people make up the bulk of the migrant population, but 
hardly all of it.    Another reason for reaching out to older workers is that some of them 
(likely a small minority in the country’s export processing zones but more numerous in 
other parts of the country) carry with them crucial memories of alternative, collective and 
state-run modes of production and experiences that span the whole of China's reform 
process.   
  
It may be useful for NGOs, local ACFTU branches and others to adopt more holistic, 
community-centered approaches to legal education in order to engage older workers 
missed by online forums and word-of-mouth legal classes.  The Asia Monitor Resource  
Centre's publication Organizing Strategies for Informal Economy Workers, while focused 
on the informal sector, offers some useful ideas that could be applied to manufacturing 
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workers, as well.71  For example, it examines how Hong Kong activists were able to build 
up community appreciation among working class and middle urbanites for high-rise 
janitors, an appreciation that could be transformed into solidarity when the janitors 
demanded better conditions. A similar “community appreciation” approach could, 
perhaps, reach isolated older workers in China's export processing zones, thus improving 
their legal rights consciousness, while developing solidarity across a broader spectrum, of 
the workforce. 
 
A different language may also be needed.  Whereas younger workers might thrill to 
notions of legal “rights,” their parents may be more receptive to the idea that society as a 
whole has certain “responsibilities” toward them that go beyond a particular regulation. 
Ching Kwan Lee has described this divide in the context of northern “rustbelt” workers in 
state-owned enterprises versus southern “sunbelt” workers in private enterprises.  But the 
same may be true for different generations within the sunbelt itself. 72  The point is not to 
simply repackage the LCL or any other law so it is appealing to older workers, but to 
open the conversation beyond the letter of the law to include core values, not only 
welcoming older workers but playing to their strengths. 
 
Access to legal assistance for workers must be expanded. 
  
As described above, many workers interviewed during this project expressed both hope 
for the developing legal protection regime, as well as doubt regarding the extent to which 
these measures will be fully implemented. This combination suggests that the PRC 
government has a window of opportunity in which to support the use of the formal labor 
dispute resolution system. Indeed, this conjecture appears to be supported by the rapid 
growth in the number of workers currently attempting to use the legal system in order to 
resolve disputes.73    
 
One way the government might provide low-income migrant labor with better access to 
the legal system is by lowering economic barriers to entry. While the system was moved 
in this direction with the promulgation of the 2007 Law of the People's Republic of China 
on Mediation and Arbitration of Labor Disputes, which increased the time limit for 
arbitration application to one year from 90 days74 and eliminated arbitration application 
fees,75 workers still face a number of obstacles when attempting to secure legal 
representation. One significant problem facing low-income workers is the high cost of 
attorney fees.    
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According to statistics from the Guangdong Provincial government, average wages for 
migrant workers in that province were just under 1,300 RMB (approximately US$189), 
while attorneys’ fees in Shenzhen can be as high as 5,000 RMB for representation in a 
labor dispute case.76  Given this situation, the vast majority of workers with labor 
disputes face a clear economic disincentive to hiring a lawyer, as only workers with labor 
disputes large enough to cover the cost of attorney fees are willing to do so.  One way the 
government may change this dynamic is through the implementation of one-sided fee-
shifting regulations. 
 
Procedures like these exist in the U.S. Fair Labor Standards Act and civil rights 
legislation.  They require the losing defendant (and never the plaintiff, i.e. never the 
worker in labor cases) to pay the attorney fees of the winning party. In the fall of 2008, 
the Shenzhen City government began to implement Regulations on the Growth and 
Development of Harmonious Labor Relations in its special economic zone.  These 
regulations allow up to 5,000 RMB in attorney fees to be paid by the employer, should a 
labor arbitration or court case find in favor of the employee.77 If the Regulations on the 
Growth and Development of Harmonious Labor Relations were to be extended to include 
the remaining Shenzhen city districts, as well as other locales, this could significantly 
decrease financial barriers for migrants seeking to use the formal labor dispute resolution 
system to resolve disputes.   
 
Activists must monitor conditions in backward “nuts and bolts” factories. 
  
Our industry-to-industry data is sparse.  However, some industries nonetheless stand out 
as particularly exploitative, such as the furniture and hardware sectors.  There are plenty 
of anecdotal stories to corroborate these findings.  For example, in 2005, several 
advocacy groups reported abuses at the Italian furniture maker DeCoro's Shenzhen plant, 
the largest sofa manufacturing facility in the world.  In October that year, DeCoro 
management arbitrarily slashed wages by 20 percent. On October 28, ten workers went to 
factory management seeking an explanation and to try to reverse the wage cuts. 
Management responded by confiscating their factory ID cards so they could no longer 
enter the factory. On October 30, these workers staged a sit-down demonstration in front 
of the factory. The following day when these 10 workers attempted to enter the plant, 
they were physically assaulted and beaten by five Italian supervisors, and required 
hospitalization.78 
 
DeCoro is not an exception.  The same conditions prevail among the makers of small 
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hardware components or even power tools.  These industries present a particular problem 
for international activists: they are less closely associated with a major brand that can be 
used as a pressure point than are toys manufactured by Mattel, for example.  Supply 
chain links must be highlighted better. New partnerships regarding the manufacture of 
basic parts, the nuts and bolts of consumer goods, for example, must be made that mimic 
the sweat-free garment activism of students, and the government garment procurement 
guidelines increasingly passed by municipalities in the U.S. and elsewhere.79      
 
Responsible businesses can take advantage of certain aspects of the LCL.  
    
Finally, the increase in both worker injury and social insurance coverage among migrant 
laborers since the implementation of the Labor Contract Law demonstrates that positive 
advancements in workers’ rights are indeed possible. Businesses can meet these 
obligations, while still maintaining their competitive edge.  After all, those workers who 
had gained coverage since the LCL's went into effect still had a job at the time of their 
interviews. Their companies had not folded.   
  
It is likely that part of the reason for this expanded insurance coverage is that employers 
saw a greater cost from non-compliance, such as costs associated with injury 
compensation, drawn-out lawsuits and strained relations with local governments.  The 
same may be said for the increased, albeit still insufficient, contract rates shown by our 
research. Provisions in the LCL like the one guaranteeing double payment of wages to 
workers who work more than a month without a contract are clear and hard to avoid; 
more employers may consequently view signing a contract as the cheapest option.     
  
Local officials, the ACFTU and NGOs must therefore continue to strive to raise the costs 
of non-compliance, through strengthening workers' ability to bargain with and monitor 
their employers at the point of production, through resisting the watering down of the 
LCL through various local implementing guidelines and through continuing to bring 
cases to court and demanding more rigorous inspections of workplaces by labor bureaus.   
But there are also ways that responsible enterprises can themselves actively contribute to 
better implementation of the LCL while still growing their businesses.    
  
The global “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) discourse has slowly shifted from 
ineffective in-house audit regimes to schemes for greater worker participation.  Hong  
Kong's Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehavior (SACOM) has helped 
establish workers committees in China through agreements with a major electronics 
manufacturer with what appear to be positive results for all parties.80  As mentioned 
above, Business for Social Responsibility and the Levi Strauss Foundation have 
commissioned a report comparing efforts at improving labor conditions in garment 
factories through worker participation and sustained NGO and brand engagement. The 
report finds benefits for both employers and employees, with workers not only enjoying 
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higher earnings but companies also gaining better line feedback on manufacturing 
inefficiencies.81   
  
Our own interviews with executives and managers showed, as noted, a great diversity of 
opinion.  Many were fearful of the LCL's effect.  Others, though, saw ways that the law 
could actually benefit their work.  Sometimes, the benefits were simply positive 
tradeoffs, such as the provisions on company secrets.  More often, the benefits were seen 
to be a long-term stabilization of the labor market and “standardization” of contracts. 
 
Of course, as stated in our introduction, not all companies will benefit from better 
implementation of the LCL.  That is simply a fact and it is, ultimately, an acceptable fact.  
In an interview with The Economic Observer Online, Renmin University's longtime 
champion of labor rights, Professor Chang Kai, argues that while “most businesses 
oppose the Labor Contract Law because of their misunderstanding of it,” China cannot 
“protect the interests of such businesses that become rich by squeezing their 
workforce.”82 This was the understanding behind the government's passage of the law in 
the first place.    
  
Laws like the LCL are not enough. 
 
Our investigation of the LCL's impact, while preliminary, has shown that more attention 
must be paid to the variety of outcomes for workers generated by this single piece of 
legislation.  When pushing for new laws, such as pension reforms or regulations 
regarding collective bargaining, we must ask: how will older workers experience a 
certain piece of legislation?  How will workers actually access the law?  Which 
industries' workers are most in need of support?  How can we encourage better business 
compliance?  Laws, even very good ones, are not everything, however. 
 
NGOs, the ACFTU, and their international supporters must help Chinese workers 
demand more than the minimum that they are due under labor regulations.  Workers 
must, moreover, learn to make their demands on the shop floor proactively, not only 
when an abuses reach the level of severity that requires a trip to an arbitration panel, or 
court, or hospital.  They must, finally, ensure that they have a strong voice in all 
important company decisions and in society more broadly.  Only then will they truly 
become “masters in their own house” (dang jia zuo zhu).   
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